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The literature on “domestic audience costs” focuses mainly on threats made by 
democratic leaders to signal credible commitments. Yet it largely ignores pledges made 
by democratic candidates along the campaign trail. Candidates often engage in a 
rhetorical “arms race” with each other to project resolve to voters on issues of 
international relations, whether it is protecting the country, fighting terrorism, or standing 
up to foreign aggression. Yet, unlike other audience costs, candidates face a conflict of 
preferences based on competing time horizons. That is, the short-term incentives 
(winning votes) for taking more hard-line stances can outweigh the long-term costs 
(getting boxed in by pledges made). Many campaign promises are mere bluster, but some 
can signal to foreign leaders a candidate’s future willingness to fight or back down, with 
important implications for crisis bargaining down the road. Using this framework, this 
paper analyzes the candidates’ rhetoric regarding foreign affairs during the 2008 U.S. 




This paper seeks to address the following questions: Do threats made by 
candidates along the campaign trail signal to foreign leaders their future resolve – or lack 
thereof? What costs, whether domestic or international, do these candidates incur for such 
rhetorical gamesmanship? Finally, when and under what conditions does a candidate get 
boxed in by campaign pledges, and what are the implications? We assume that once 
elected, democratic leaders make foreign policy decisions based on sound, rational 
calculations influenced by their preferences and those of their constituencies. But the 
literature does not take into account that leaders are beholden to previously taken partisan 
stances made (often in haste) along the campaign trail that can box them in. I argue that 
campaign promises do in fact impose future costs on candidates once in office by boxing 
them in.  
                                                 
1 Author can be contacted at lionel.beehner@gmail.com. 
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This paper proceeds as follows: First, I review the audience costs literature and 
examine how it relates to elections and campaign rhetoric. Next, I outline my theoretical 
argument and causal mechanism. Finally, I briefly examine the 2008 U.S. presidential 
race, the campaign positions taken by the candidates and their posturing on the wars in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Georgia to determine if their proclamations incurred any future 
“audience costs,” 2 and what implications they had for international relations. 3 
 
Literature Review  
According to the literature on “audience costs,” democracies are better able to 
overcome informational gaps and reveal their true preferences early on in crises, thus 
preventing escalation. Facing a steeper cost for waging—and losing—a war than, say, 
unelected autocrats, democratic leaders are less likely to bluff or try “limited probes” 
during a crisis (Fearon 1994). Voters, especially those concerned about the reputations of 
their country, disapprove when their leaders do not follow through on verbal threats made 
(Tomz 2007). Conversely, opposing states are more likely to assume that threats made by 
democratic leaders are more credible due to their higher “audience costs.” That is, they 
would be more likely to see a drop in their popularity or be voted out of office if they 
issued a threat and then backed down. Because democracies are better able to signal their 
intentions than non-democracies, this greater transparency reduces the security dilemma 
between states and lowers the risk of crises escalating into war (Russett, Oneal 2000).  
But this theory neglects an important component of the democratic process: 
elections campaigns. During election years, candidates make any number of foreign 
policy pronouncements along the campaign trail to win over undecided voters. They face 
a conflict of preferences based on conflicting time horizons. That is, their first order of 
business is to win the election, or at least win over undecided voters in the immediate 
                                                 
2 This paper does not assume that candidates are cynical or irrational and will say anything to win votes or 
always take a partisan stance but that their positions do shift depending on what voters want, as the 2008 
case of Georgia illustrates.  
3 Generally speaking, audience costs theory deals with threats, not promises. For the purposes of this paper, 
I will use the two interchangeably, since a candidate who is not an incumbent cannot obviously carry out a 
threat until in power. So stump speeches on foreign policy, almost by definition, are promises. I understand 
the difference is not just semantic. As Robert Jervis (2002) writes, “I might be believed to be ready to carry 
out my promises but not my threats.” Renato Corbetta, in a working paper (“Informal Commitments and 
Intervention in Ongoing Conflicts”), finds that states make any number of “informal commitments”; most 
just signal “cheap talk” but some of which incurs “reputational costs” to states.  
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state they are campaigning in. To do this, they often make statements that project resolve. 
In this sense, they are driven by a shortsighted goal. But they also prefer flexibility once 
in office to negotiate treaties, bargain with their foreign counterparts, and escalate or 
terminate conflicts—in short, leave their stamp on the world.4 They prefer not to be 
boxed in. As candidates, they are motivated by ego, ambition, and winning votes, not by 
winning friends and allies abroad.5 They face two decisions once in office: They can 
renege on their campaign promises and risk alienating voters next time up for office, or 
they can follow through on their promises, so as not to lose political capital both at home 
and abroad.6  
Indeed, the words of candidates signal to foreign states their future willingness to 
fight or not fight, should a crisis arise. At the basis of this theory is an audience-cost 
mechanism linking a state’s foreign policy with the selection and domestic “punishment” 
of its leaders. James Fearon (1994), for example, writes about a dilemma leaders face 
regarding misplaced incentives to exaggerate or misrepresent their willingness to use 
force or escalate crises. They make veiled public warnings, or deploy or mobilize forces. 
The idea is to signal that the preferred course of action for the state is to use force rather 
than to make concessions (Fearon 1997).7 This is meant to “demonstrate resolve” in the 
face of a threat. The opponent, realizing the credible commitment of the democratic 
leader’s action, will either escalate or back down. A leader who chooses to back down is 
perceived to suffer a greater “diplomatic humiliation” (Schelling 1960) the more the 
crisis escalates. But as a crisis grows, a leader can expect greater reward for standing 
firm, provided the state’s opponent backs down. Think of a poker player winning a large 
pot after the final round of betting. 
                                                 
4 Notice the media-driven trend ever since Harry Truman of stamping a president’s name with a doctrine, 
so we have a “Bush Doctrine,” a “Clinton Doctrine,” and so forth.  
5 Note John McCain’s repeated campaign slogan in 2008 of saying the three letters he saw when he stared 
into Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s eyes were “K-G-B.” One imagines his rhetoric toward Russia 
would have changed and been less caustic if he had won the presidency.  
6 This kind of election cost is obviously not present for an incumbent candidate who wins reelection, unless 
they are grooming their vice president to follow in their place. This argument is made often to support the 
fact that second-term presidents often have very successful tenures in terms of foreign policy, because they 
are neither seeking the approval of the international community nor of domestic voters. They also are 
worried about cementing their “legacy,” and so look to achieve grandiose bargains of lasting import, like a 
Middle East peace deal.  
7 Fearon (1997) distinguishes between two different types of “costly signals”: tying hands and sunk costs.  
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Thus, state leaders “have private information about their willingness to use force 
rather than compromise, and they can have incentives to misrepresent this information to 
gain a better deal,” writes Fearon (1994). But the audience costs literature has come 
under some intense scrutiny from scholars in recent years for lacking rationalism (Sartori, 
2002), for downplaying the importance of an audience’s policy preferences (Snyder and 
Borghard 2010), and for lacking plausibility when tested with conflict datasets that 
contain actual threats (Downes and Sechser 2011). Also, presidential candidates, though 
privy to daily intelligence briefings on national security threats, do not have complete 
information. Nor would it necessarily matter, since they may have a private incentive to 
exaggerate threats (especially if the threats are perceived to be the responsibility of 
botched policies by an incumbent). No candidate in recent history has won an election by 
waxing soft or uncertain on perceived foreign threats.8 The result is an escalation of 
tough-sounding rhetoric. Much of what gets said on the campaign trail is just rhetorical 
noise and “cheap talk” and thus not a credible signaling mechanism of future policies or 
preferences. Still, leaders in foreign capitals cannot tell which statements are just 
campaign bluster to win votes, and which are genuine policy stances.  
 
Electoral Audience Costs 
 There are obvious audience costs present during campaigns, though these are 
different from those facing democratic leaders once in office. Fearon writes about “public 
demands or threats [that] ‘engage the national honor’” if a leader backs down in the face 
of a threat made. He argues that domestic audiences “may provide the strongest 
incentives for leaders to guard their states’ ‘international’ reputations.” Adds Kenneth 
Schultz (1999): “[V]oters are therefore motivated to punish those who sully the national 
honor by making public commitments and then failing to carry through on them. Making 
a threat and then backing down would be seen by voters —and exploited by challengers – 
as a foreign policy failure.” Yet, candidates have private incentives to sound more macho, 
                                                 
8 This is not to assume that all presidential candidates must be anti-war, as the 2012 Republican field of 
candidates suggests.  
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patriotic, and resolute on issues of national security than their opponent.9 The cost of not 
engaging in this rhetorical arms race with one’s opponent may be an electoral defeat. 
Thus, like in other cases of crisis bargaining, both camps of a presidential contest may 
have hidden incentives to bluff.  
There are two audiences for every speech a candidate makes, and they are often in 
conflict. The first audience for these pronouncements is undecided voters in key swing 
states. According to the Pew Research Center, 63 percent of undecided voters are female, 
27 percent are age sixty-five and older, and many tend to be less well educated and more 
religious than voters who have already chosen their candidate.10 Scholars find that 
domestic audience costs tend to be highest among doves, isolationists, the highly 
educated, and Democrats than among other demographic groups (Tomz 2007). This 
finding suggests, then, that audience costs would be lower among undecided voters.11 
Moreover, empirically we find that a strong, muscular foreign policy sells well to a less 
educated American electorate, whose “citizens disapprove of empty threats” (Tomz 2007, 
831). That partly explains why candidates drape themselves in the colors of the flag, 
surround themselves with military vets in uniform, and make bold declarations of 
protecting their country. 
The second audience, which candidates often forget, is foreign states. After all, 
one of the candidates will prove victorious and become leader, and so both of their 
statements are parsed in the international press and can act as signaling mechanisms not 
just of future policy preferences but also credible commitments of future resolve – or lack 
thereof (if they fail to follow through, this can signal “hollow threats,” which can then be 
interpreted that the candidates do not mean what they say or are dishonest).12 The world 
                                                 
9 Recall the most talked-about campaign ad from the 2008 election was Hillary Clinton’s “3 a.m. phone 
call” ad, which suggested that her primary opponent, Barack Obama, was untested on issues of national 
security.  
10 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96403104 
11 With Tea Party-mania sweeping U.S. politics, one prediction, given the “audience costs” literature 
(Tomz, 2007) is that as American voters lean increasingly isolationist and non-interventionist, then 
audience costs can be expected to rise, not drop. The implications, in theory, would be fewer American-led 
crises escalating into conflicts. Consider the growing unpopularity of the U.S.-led NATO intervention in 
Libya among opposition candidates in the 2012 presidential election and among lawmakers in Congress.  
12 Robert Jervis (2002) suggests such explicit signaling of strength may act in reverse. He writes: “For an 
actor to claim that it is committed to taking a certain action will increase the costs it will pay if it behaves 
otherwise, and if this were the only effect this would increase others' estimates of how likely it is to carry 
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influences the election’s participants as much as vice versa. Kristopher Ramsay (2004) 
writes that candidates are rational actors aware that the “world is watching,” and so “open 
political competition at the national level influences, or gets influenced by, the politics 
between states.”13 But foreign leaders do not know these candidates because most enter 
elections without a clear record on international affairs. This uncertainty, heightened by 
rhetorical gamesmanship made by candidates along the campaign trail, can trigger an 
unintended escalation of hostilities and conflicts abroad. A foreign power may dismiss an 
ultimatum issued by a candidate as mere bluster or “cheap talk.” After all, because an 
opposition candidate cannot mobilize troops or form alliances, it cannot credibly signal 
commitments of resolve. “The opposition,” Ramsay (2004) writes, “has no policy lever 
that can reveal its competence or one that can undermine the nation's reputation.”  
Moreover, given the sheer volume of such pronouncements, the message may fall 
on deaf ears abroad.14 Yet because of the 24-hour news cycle that chronicles a 
candidate’s every last word, not to mention campaign seasons that now stretch for over a 
year, candidates’ speeches are dissected for clues of future behavior. This is not the case 
for congressional races. Scholars generally agree it is the executive branch, not Congress, 
which controls foreign policy. Congress can erect roadblocks, but it is powerless to 
prevent a president from waging war (Howell and Pevehouse 2005).15 Because a 
president is the decider when it comes to U.S. foreign policy, foreign governments should 
parse his statements as a candidate for signals of resolve, or lack thereof.  
Consistency also bedevils candidates for higher office. After all, audience 
preferences vary from state to state. What wins hearts in Miami may turn off voters in 
Philadelphia. Thus, a rational candidate should tailor their message to the audience whose 
                                                 
out this act.  But the fact that the actor felt the need to commit itself conveys information, and others may 
infer that only the weak need to try to bolster their resolve.”  
13 Ramsay examines the role the opposition plays during a crisis, focusing on the Berlin crisis and 
presidential campaign of 1948 and Suez crisis of 1956.  
14 During the 2008 campaign, Barack Obama promised to deliver an annual address on U.S. foreign policy. 
"I'll give an annual 'State of the World' address to the American people in which I lay out our national 
security policy,” he said in an October 2, 2007 speech. Despite the bold promise, he has never delivered 
such an address.   
15 In their article (International Organization, 2005), Jon Pevehouse and William Howell do not argue that 
Congress should be ignored, unlike most of the literature on America’s use of force. Specifically they find 
that, at least with regards to major uses of force during the second half of the 20th century, it depends on the 
partisan composition of Congress.  
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votes are most up for grabs but that also runs the risk of being inconsistent, which can 
signal a lack of confidence in foreign matters. Tomz (2007) finds that 72 percent of 
respondents complain that inconsistency hurts the reputation and credibility of the 
country. It can also result in reflexive speeches by candidates that emphasize “supporting 
our men and women in uniform” but by extension, leaving open the specificities, such as 
boosting funding for the war effort (which if it includes veterans’ care, supplies, and 
troops in the field can heighten the conditions for conflict escalation). Other reflexive 
campaign rhetoric can manifest itself in stances against competitors like China or Russia. 
A candidate is rewarded for tough-sounding rhetoric by being voted into office. Once in 
power, leaders must then either follow through on their campaign promises, or back 
down and risk alienating voters and losing reelection in four years.16  
According to the democratic peace tradition, democratic institutions promote 
peace for several reasons: First, they promote accountability and competition among 
parties, which in turn places constraints on the executive branch; they raise the political 
risks and costs of waging war (Bueno de Mesquita 1992; Lake 1992); democratic 
institutions reveal important information about a leader’s incentives in a crisis and 
improve a government’s ability to credibly signal their commitment and resolve (Schulz 
1999). Finally, transparent institutions overcome the informational asymmetries that 
cause crisis bargaining to break down.  But elections do not always comply with this 
peace-making calculus. For one, to win votes, candidates make speeches to signal their 
strength on issues of national security. They are not thinking about future interactions 
with foreign leaders but instead trying to project strength, confidence, and patriotism. 
Again, candidates’ short-term goal of winning the election often conflicts with their long-
term preferences—to not get boxed in on matters of foreign policy. Yet this projection of 
tougher resolve and security, such as building a missile shield in Europe, can be 
misperceived as a threat to foreign powers. Because foreign leaders cannot determine 
which threats are genuine and which are not, they must assume that a candidate’s rhetoric 
will more or less align with future policies, and react accordingly. 
                                                 
16 A classic example is Barack Obama’s January 19, 2008, campaign speech in which he promised to 
recognize the Armenian genocide as president. Yet in a statement on April 24, 2009, a day of memorial for 
the event, he never mentioned the word “genocide” and he has not officially endorsed a House resolution 
recognizing the genocide, ostensibly for fear of upsetting Turkey (Source: Politifact.com). 
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According to the “audience costs” literature (Fearon 1994), democratic leaders are 
less likely to make threats because they do not want to suffer the domestic backlash for 
not following through on their commitment.17 Put another way, domestic audiences can 
enhance credibility of our commitments abroad by “punishing leaders who say one thing 
but do another.” Conversely, if they do make a threat, a foreign leader is more likely to 
back down because they know that a democratic leader cannot back down and thus is 
serious about the threat. Where audience costs are low—such as in an autocracy—these 
kinds of threats are viewed as less credible because the costs are lower if the autocrat 
backs down (North Korea has repeatedly promised to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.”). But 
a democratic candidate, unlike a democratic leader, is less bounded. Again, the incentive 
to bluff in the short term to win voters is high. Because they are driven by ego and 
ambition, the short-term preferences and cost-benefit analysis of democratic candidates 
more often mirror those of autocrats than democratic leaders.  
Sometimes these statements are bold promises—such as Barak Obama’s promises 
to close Guantanamo or to pull combat troops out of Iraq—that line up with a candidate’s 
actual policy preferences. That is to say, sometimes pronouncements dovetail with a 
candidate’s moral and political philosophy and with their normative view about how the 
world should work. But some positions will be formulated based solely on interactions 
with their opponent and informed by short-term calculation to appeal to voters in a 
certain state or region. Candidates campaigning in southern Florida, for instance, may 
privately advocate greater engagement with Havana. But to win Cuban-American voters, 
their speech will have to sound hawkish on U.S.-Cuban relations. In recent presidential 
campaigns, there are several instances when candidates looking to win voters tended to 
take hard-line or hawkish stances when it came to issues of national security, specifically 
on prominent issues such as border security, fighting terrorism abroad, or addressing 
potential threats like Russia or China. The short-term incentive is to not only exaggerate 
perceived threats abroad—whether Islamic terrorism or Russian resurgence—but to 
exaggerate their own resolve and determination should a threat emerge.  
                                                 
17 Snyder and Borghard (2009) disagree. They find that audience-cost mechanisms are rare and have a 
small effect on crisis behavior. Yes, the public cares “about their country’s reputation and national honor 
but independently of whether their leader issues an explicit threat.” But more important, they argue: “[R]eal 
audiences care far more about the overall substantive consequences of the leader’s policy, which we call 
policy costs, than they do about the leader’s consistency between threats and subsequent actions.”  
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Voter preferences, of course, also matter. The public is not always a gun-shy force 
for pacifism or a check on democratic leaders’ ability to wage war, contrary to 
democratic peace theory. That is because of all-volunteer professional militaries, and the 
diminished influence of anti-war groups (Rosato 2003). As one historian noted, “The 
American public has wanted only one thing from its commander in chief: quick wars for 
substantial victories with minimal costs (Reiter and Stam 2002).   
Much also depends on domestic conditions. The literature is divided on the 
influence of such conditions on U.S. decisions to use force. Some scholars find that 
political leaders “see” opportunities to use force abroad or escalate hostilities when the 
domestic economy is not good or they lack a clear plan to rescue the economy (Russett 
1990). Others find that electoral cycles have little bearing on a president’s decision to use 
force (Gowa 1998). Moore and Lanoue (2003) argue that “international politics, not 
domestic politics, [must be] the primary determinant of conflictual U.S. foreign policy 
behavior.” Wang (1996) finds that both “internal and international influences operate but 
that force is invoked less frequently when elections are near (perhaps because the rally 
effect is too unreliable) and more often to avoid a foreign policy defeat that would be 
politically damaging than to achieve outright political gains.”  
  The incentives to push for war ahead of or during an election can vary. Some 
scholars suggest that crises abroad can distract voters from a candidate’s lack of domestic 
policy experience or declining popularity (or perhaps some scandal). Also, incumbents, 
especially those facing sinking public approval ratings, may seek to create a “rally around 
the flag” effect (Howell and Pevehouse 2005; Waltz 1967). Exaggerating a foreign threat 
or instilling fear can scare up votes. Candidates can signal resolve to voters with tough 
rhetoric against foreign enemies.18 John Kerry used this tactic when he repeatedly 
criticized incumbent President George W. Bush for apparently not pursuing Osama Bin 




                                                 
18 Much has been made of presidential candidates sounding tough on Russia and China on the campaign 
trail, only to cave or be swooned in front of their leaders once in office. Recall George W. Bush’s “looked 
into his soul” comment when he met Vladimir Putin in 2000.  
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Empirical Cases from the 2008 U.S. Election 
This paper will examine two examples from the 2008 U.S. presidential contest, 
which dominated the foreign policy agenda: the war in Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion 
of Georgia. These case studies provide conflicting outcomes. In the first, President 
Obama persisted with his policy despite domestic political costs. In the second, the 
president reneged on his campaign promise with little consequence. 
The “situation in Iraq” ranked as the most important issue among voters (along 
with the economy), according to a February 2008 Gallup poll.19 A subsequent poll taken 
in August 2008 found that Republicans, by a margin of two-to-one, rejected a timetable 
for withdrawing from Iraq. By contrast, Democrats favored a phased withdrawal by a 
ratio of five-to-one.20 Hence, a common talking point of Barack Obama’s campaign was 
differentiating the “good” war in Afghanistan with the “bad” war in Iraq. In the words of 
the New York Times, Obama’s anti-war rhetoric “electrified and motivated his liberal 
base.”21 Contrast Obama’s comments on Iraq with those of his opponent, John McCain. 
“The success we’ve achieved so far was not because we were threatening them. The 
success we’ve achieved so far is because we told them we were staying…to threaten 
withdrawal, frankly, is an option that I would be very reluctant to exercise unless I was 
sure that we had no other option, and I think we have lots of them.”22 McCain’s position 
was one of not disrupting the status quo, for fear of destabilizing Iraq, while Obama had 
carved a position as that of the anti-Iraq War candidate. During the candidates’ second 
debate, Obama said “[P]art of the reason I think it's so important for us to end the war in 
Iraq is to be able to get more troops into Afghanistan.” He gave a 16-month calendar for 
removing all combat troops from Iraq, a pledge he later followed through on in August 
2010.23  




22 Interview with John McCain, New York Times (September 17, 2008): 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/iraq.html 
23 In a August 2 speech, President Obama confirmed the end of all combat operations in Iraq but agreed to 
leave 50,000-65,000 troops to advise and assist the Iraqi military and government as well as protect U.S. 
interests.   
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Contradicting his exit strategy from Iraq, President Obama’s surge of forces into 
Afghanistan has proven more contentious. In a speech delivered back in October 2007, 
Obama pledged, “As president, I would deploy at least two additional brigades to 
Afghanistan to re-enforce our counter-terrorism operations and support NATO's efforts 
against the Taliban.” He also promised to ratchet up non-military aid in Afghanistan to $1 
billion. Perhaps most controversially, he said “if we have actionable intelligence about 
high-value terrorist targets and [then-Pakistani] President Musharraf won't act, we will.” 
The purpose of his speech was less to win voters than to differentiate his counterterrorism 
platform from that of his Democratic primary opponent and to sound more hawkish.  
In this case, Obama the president followed through on pledges made by Obama 
the candidate. He surged 30,000 forces into Afghanistan, put more pressure on Pakistan, 
and eventually even carried out his threat to act unilateraly to kill or capture al-Qaeda’s 
leader were he provided with actionable intelligence, something his opponents suggested 
was naive becaues it would imperil U.S.-Pakistani relations. He did get a small “bump” 
in his approval ratings, which rose above 50 percent approval in a May Gallup poll for 
the first time in several months.24 
Yet the president has suffered audience costs precisely because he followed 
through on his promise to focus more on the war in Afghanistan. Over the past few years, 
America’s public mood has soured on the war in Afghanistan. According to an August 
2009 Washington Post/ABC News poll, 45% of those polled favored a drawdown of 
forces in Afghanistan.25 That made the president’s deliberations on the war, particularly 
his delicate balancing act between his civilian staff and military generals, a messier and 
more drawn-out process than anticipated. Also, his use of unmanned drone strikes against 
terrorist targets in Pakistan opened him up to criticism of killing civilians and turning 
Pakistanis against America. His speech delivered to West Point cadets on December 1, 
2009, was a hedge of sorts: He ordered 30,000 combat troops into Afghanistan but also 
promised to begin drawing down forces by July 2011—a promise which he fulfilled.26  
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In this sense, Obama was boxed in by his campaign rhetoric; he could not 
credibly draw down forces without reneging on a previously made campaign promise. 
That arguably ended up costing him in terms of credibility among voters. A Gallup poll 
showed that the public’s approval rating of Obama’s handling of the war had dropped 
from 56% in July 2009 to 35% in December 2009.27 It also may have hurt his credibility 
in terms of resolve among the military and appearing indecisive among some foreign 
leaders. There was dissent within military circles, even forcing the resignation of the 
president’s top military commander in Afghanistan. And there was internal backbiting 
within his top circle of civilian advisors that negatively affected morale, decision-making, 
and public views of the war.28 Internationally, Hamid Karzai denounced the President’s 
strategy as an overreach of U.S. military power. In sum, there was a ratcheting up of 
expectations by a candidate that in the end proved damaging once in office. That is, his 
preferences as a candidate conflicted with his preferences as a commander in chief. By 
terming the campaign in Afghanistan the “good war,” Obama could not credibly commit 
to a drawdown of forces, without going against his campaign pledge.29 
A second case to consider was Russia’s war in Georgia. On August 8, 2008, 
Russian tanks rolled into South Osettia, a breakaway province of Georgia. Following the 
invasion, there was tit-for-tat rhetorical gamesmanship between the American 
presidential candidates to signal support for Georgia and resolve against Russia. Obama 
called for both sides to exercise restraint (he was on vacation in Hawaii at the time and 
appeared somewhat surprised by the invasion). By contrast, McCain, whose foreign 
policy advisors enjoyed close ties with the leadership in Tbilisi, immediately and 
forcefully condemned Moscow for its act of aggression. He also placed blame not only 
on the Russians but also on NATO for not admitting Georgia. After Russia escalated the 
conflict, McCain gave his now-infamous “We are all Georgians” speech, in which he 
said, “[W]e learned at great cost the price of allowing aggression against free nations to 
                                                 
27 http://www.gallup.com/poll/124520/obama-approval-afghanistan-trails-issues.aspx 
28 A confidential report by General Stanley McChrystal calling for more forces or else face “mission 
failure” was mysteriously leaked to the Bob Woodward of the Washington Post in September 2009 
(“McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure,” Bob Woodward, Washington Post, September 21, 2009: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html).  
29 Arguably a case could be made that the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden provided a window of 
opportunity to draw down from a position of strength.  
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go unchecked. With our allies, we must stand in united purpose to persuade the Russian 
government to withdraw its troops from Georgia.”30 Caught off-guard, Obama followed 
suit by ratcheting up his anti-Russia rhetoric in a forcefully worded August 12 statement: 
“Now is the time for action, not just words. It is past time for the Russian government to 
immediately sign and implement a cease-fire. Russia must halt its violation of Georgian 
airspace and withdraw its ground forces from Georgia, with international monitors to 
verify that these obligations are met.”31  
The Georgia issue received considerable attention in the candidates’ second 
debate and galvanized the American public. Indeed, the war became a proxy of sorts for 
whether the future commander in chief would be willing to stand up to aggression abroad 
and “defend freedom.” By a margin of 52 percent to 27 percent, voters supported McCain 
over Obama to deal with a resurgent Russia, according to an August 2008 Quinnipiac 
poll conducted shortly after the war.32 Interestingly, Obama’s vice presidential candidate, 
Joseph Biden, who had previously visited Georgia, sounded decidedly more pro-Georgia 
than his running mate. “The war that began in Georgia is no longer about that country 
alone,” Biden told reporters at the time.33 “It has become a question of whether and how 
the West will stand up for the rights of free people throughout the region. The outcome 
there will determine whether we realize the grand ambition of a Europe that is whole, 
free, and at peace.” (He later convinced the Bush administration to green-light $1 billion 
in emergency aid to Georgia). Similarly, McCain’s running mate, Sarah Palin, made 
headlines after hinting in an interview with ABC News’ Charlie Gibson that she would be 
willing to “go to war with Russia” to defend Georgia.34 In a further show gamesmanship, 
McCain dispatched his wife Cindy to Tbilisi to visit Georgian soldiers. At rallies, 
McCain invoked the war in Georgia to demonstrate his opponent’s inexperience to be 
commander in chief. “When Russia invaded Georgia,” he told supporters in late August. 
“Senator Obama said the invaded country should show restraint. He's been wrong on all 
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of these. When I am president, we're going to win in Iraq, win in Afghanistan, and our 
troops will come home in victory and honor, not in defeat.”35   
The Russian leadership paid close attention to how the war was portrayed by the 
candidates. Prime Minister Putin, while at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, suggested to reporters the war had been instigated at the behest of the 
McCain camp or then-Vice President Dick Cheney’s office to win Republican votes. 
Other countries, following the American candidates’ lead, piled on Russia for trying to 
“redraw boundaries.” A few European leaders even threatened sanctions against Moscow. 
In response, Russian officials said they would not be intimidated or isolated. 
Did Obama’s rhetoric on the Georgian war tie his hands once he became 
president? That is, did he suffer any audience costs, whether domestic or international, 
for his campaign rhetoric against Russia? On one hand, Obama’s initial call for restraint 
proved prescient, as a European Union commission the following year found that both 
sides were responsible for the outbreak of hostilities, not just Russia.36 Yet, by ratcheting 
up his pro-Georgia rhetoric, Obama found himself in an awkward position once he 
assumed office. On the other hand, he quickly went about repairing relations – or as he 
put it, “hitting the reset button” – with Russia, knowing that he would need Moscow’s 
help to rein in Iran and revise the set-to-expire START agreement. Obama rarely if ever 
mentioned Georgia after assuming office, except to dispatch Biden to Tbilisi to deliver a 
dose of “tough love” to the Georgians, accusing the leadership of not following through 
on democratic reforms. The vice president also did not deliver a package of military 
hardware the Georgians desired (Washington also shelved considerations of fast-tracking 
Georgia for NATO membership, though the 2008 Bucharest summit had already set back 
Tbilisi’s prospects to join the bloc). In short, Georgia was put aside in favor of other 
foreign policy priorities.37 In this case, Georgia may prove that candidates do not suffer 
great audience costs for reneging on commitments made on the campaign trail.  
                                                 
35 http://projects.washingtonpost.com/obama-speeches/speech/26/ 
36 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,650228,00.html 
37 One offshoot to Obama’s position on Georgia was his stance on a missile defense shield in Central 
Europe. On September 10, 2008, he told The O’Reilly Factor, “Given what has happened in Georgia, I 
think we have to send a clear signal that Poland and other countries in that region are not going to be 
subject to intimidation and aggression….I think the missile shield is appropriate. I want to make sure it 
works though.” The following September, however, Obama announced a shift in his predecessor’s missile 
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Still, the Georgia-Russia war proved to be an instructional litmus test for Obama 
as commander in chief. The candidate reacted with a measured response, not a rash rush 
to blame one side. That kind of thoughtful discipline has shaped his reactions to crises 
abroad. Further, he called for a United Nations Security Council resolution to condemn 
the invasion, a move signaling his belief in the normative power of international 
institutions.38 Obama reversed course once in office and sought to repair relations with 
Russia, which ran counter to his campaign’s tough rhetoric. While the lack of resolve his 
Republican opponent accused him of did not go unnoticed in foreign capitals, Obama’s 
popularity and political capital abroad were largely unaffected.  
 Arguably, a case could be made that President Obama suffered audience costs for 
his inconsistent position on Afghanistan but not Georgia. Why? First, the stakes for the 
American public were higher for the former. The war in Afghanistan, despite the lack of 
shared costs, had declined in popularity among many Americans by the time he took 
office. Regardless, Obama carried out his pledge to send more forces into the country, 
only to begin drawing them down less than two years later. It is uncertain what kind of 
reputational costs the United States may suffer, but Obama did endure audience costs in 
terms of his sagging approval ratings for following through on his pledge to surge into 
Afghanistan, a factor of the conflict’s diminishing popularly among a war-weary public. 
By contrast, the war in Georgia was a brief crisis despite the widespread attention it 
received during the campaign. Obama reneged on his promise to support Georgia, though 
to a smaller degree than his Republican opponent. Once he was elected, President Obama 
embraced realism,39 believing that Russian cooperation, arms control negotiations, and 
strong bilateral ties outweighed any obligations Washington owed Tbilisi in terms of 
military or moral support. The American public barely noticed that he never criticized 
Russia for its heavy-handed invasion. But it did penalize the White House (at least in poll 
numbers) for its perceived mishandling and escalation of the war in Afghanistan. In this 
                                                 
defense policy that called for scrapping plans for advanced radar in the Czech Republic as well as the 
missile defense shield in Poland. Obama instead called for a redesigned system aimed at shooting down 
short- and medium-range missiles from sites closer to Iran. 
38 http://www.politicususa.com/en/Obama-Russia-Georgia 
39 Obama’s realpolitik, as evidenced by his cozying up to China and Russia, has won him the ire of the 
human rights community for not pressing harder on human rights abuses. Obama has favored larger states 
at the expense of smaller, more expendable ones. That said, he is not card-carrying realist, given his 
statements on the importance of international institutions and his Nobel Peace Prize speech on “just war.”  
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sense, Obama was boxed in by his campaign pledge.40 Of course, the reverse argument 
could also be made: Had Obama as a candidate promised a tougher U.S. military posture 
on Afghanistan, only to pull out forces once elected president, then his credibility among 
NATO allies and the military may have suffered. 
There is an obvious selection bias with the two cases cited above, which are not 
meant to constitute a fair or scientific sample size. The case studies are far from complete 
or comprehensive and may not capture public attitudes or preferences, given the 
differences in their importance (one is a decade-long war costing thousands of American 
lives; the other was a five-day conflict costing hundreds of non-American lives). Nor is it 
clear that such election audience costs are generalizable to other democracies, particularly 
those with shorter campaigns or parliamentary systems, or where foreign policy is a less 
salient issue. Audience costs theorists might dismiss promises made by candidates as too 
weak or imprecise to generate audience costs high enough to matter. But the empirical 
evidence of recent U.S. presidential elections suggests otherwise. Once elected, 
candidates do find their policies affected by commitments made along the campaign trail. 
While the above case studies do not provide an exhaustive examination of a candidate’s 
audience costs, they do provide new evidence to spur further research on an overlooked 
area related to the effects of elections on signaling future strength and weakness abroad. 
 
Conclusion 
The effect of campaign pledges made by presidential candidates – and what 
audience costs, if any, are incurred – has been under-studied by international relations 
theorists. Once in office, democratic leaders can be punished at the polls for backing 
down in the face of a crisis or for not following through on a threat. But they often put 
themselves in these untenable positions because of hawkish pledges made on the 
campaign trail to win undecided voters and one-up their opponents. The 2008 presidential 
race is instructive: Barack Obama promised to escalate the war in Afghanistan, a pledge 
that boxed him in once, as commander in chief, he sought to draw down forces and the 
                                                 
40 Here I am agnostic whether the surge and subsequent drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan reflected 
Obama’s true preferences, or whether they were in response to shifting public moods on the war. What I 
am interested in demonstrating is how Obama put lots of capital in  the war in Afghanistan, followed 
through on his campaign pledge, and was punished.   
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war turned unpopular. As a candidate, he also backed Georgia during its August 2008 
conflict with Russia, only to turn his back on Tbilisi once in office. For this reversal he 
did not suffer any real audience or reputational costs, either at home or abroad. Perhaps 
this is because not everything a candidate says is a credible signal of resolve. But once 
elected, leaders can and do face audience costs, both domestic and international, for 
failing to follow through (or vice versa) on their election promises. Further empirical 
research is required to sufficiently test this theory and measure the effects of campaign 
pledges on future reputational costs. But the 2008 presidential election sheds some light 
on the conundrum candidates face when making campaign pledges on foreign policy, 
demonstrating that macho posturing can escalate tensions abroad, heighten conflict, and 
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